Microsoft Sentinel medium experimental kql
AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection
'Identifies suspicious AD FS authentication by correlating Security events from "AD FS Auditing" with Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) events for incoming port 80 traffic. This may indicate a threat actor abusing AD FS replication services to obtain configuration settings and sensitive information such as AD FS certificates. Enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS server before using this query. References: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-logging https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672'
Detection Logic
// Adjust this to use a longer timeframe to identify ADFS servers
//let lookback = 0d;
// Adjust this to adjust detection timeframe
//let timeframe = 1d;
// SamAccountName of AD FS Service Account. Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
//let adfsuser = 'adfsadmin';
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = (
SecurityEvent
//
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventSourceName == 'AD FS Auditing'
| distinct Computer
);
SecurityEvent
//
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
// A token of type 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/servicemodel/tokens/SecureConversation'
// for relying party '-' was successfully authenticated.
| where EventID == 412
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
| join kind=inner
(
SecurityEvent
//
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
// Events to identify caller identity from event 412
| where EventID == 501
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| where tostring(EventData[1]) contains 'identity/claims/name'
| extend InstanceId = tostring(EventData[0])
| extend ClaimsName = tostring(EventData[2])
// Filter on the use of a specific AD FS user account
//
| where ClaimsName contains adfsuser
)
on $left.InstanceId == $right.InstanceId
| join kind=inner
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5156
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key = tostring(column_ifexists('@Name', "")), Value = column_ifexists('#text', "")
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID)
| extend DestPort = column_ifexists("DestPort", ""),
Direction = column_ifexists("Direction", ""),
Application = column_ifexists("Application", ""),
DestAddress = column_ifexists("DestAddress", ""),
SourceAddress = column_ifexists("SourceAddress", ""),
SourcePort = column_ifexists("SourcePort", "")
// Look for inbound connections from endpoints on port 80
| where DestPort == 80 and Direction == '%%14592' and Application == 'System'
| where DestAddress !in ('::1','0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1')
)
on $left.Computer == $right.Computer
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClaimsName, SourceAddress, SourcePort
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ClaimsName, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ClaimsName, @'\')[0]) Field Validations
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