Browse Rules

Search and filter across all detection sources

12 rules

sentinel medium kql

ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection

'This detection uses Sysmon telemetry to detect suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database). In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIdD 18 (Pipe Connected). If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating: Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"'

sentinel medium kql

Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS Suspicious Application

'This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify a suspicious application adding a server instance to an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service or deleting the AD FS service instance. Usually the Microsoft Entra ID Connect Health Agent application with ID cf6d7e68-f018-4e0a-a7b3-126e053fb88d and ID cb1056e2-e479-49de-ae31-7812af012ed8 is used to perform those operations.'

sentinel high kql

Microsoft Entra ID Role Management Permission Grant

'Identifies when the Microsoft Graph RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (Delegated or Application) permission is granted to a service principal. This permission allows an application to read and manage the role-based access control (RBAC) settings for your company's directory. An adversary could use this permission to add an Microsoft Entra ID object to an Admin directory role and escalate privileges. Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/graph/permissions-reference#role-management-permissions Ref :

sentinel medium kql

Microsoft Entra ID Health Monitoring Agent Registry Keys Access

'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key of Microsoft Entra ID Health monitoring agent. This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Online\Reporting\MonitoringAgent. You can find more information in here https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/master/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_monitoring_agent.yml '

sentinel medium kql

AD FS Remote Auth Sync Connection

'Identifies suspicious AD FS authentication by correlating Security events from "AD FS Auditing" with Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) events for incoming port 80 traffic. This may indicate a threat actor abusing AD FS replication services to obtain configuration settings and sensitive information such as AD FS certificates. Enable AD FS auditing on the AD FS server before using this query. References: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/troubleshooting/ad-fs-tshoot-l

sentinel medium kql

AD FS Remote HTTP Network Connection

'This detection uses Sysmon events (NetworkConnect events) to detect incoming network traffic on port 80 on AD FS servers. This could be a sign of a threat actor trying to use replication services on the AD FS server to get its configuration settings and extract sensitive information such as AD FS certificates. In order to use this query you need to enable Sysmon telemetry on the AD FS Server. Reference: https://twitter.com/OTR_Community/status/1387038995016732672 '

sentinel high kql

Admin promotion after Role Management Application Permission Grant

'This rule looks for a service principal being granted the Microsoft Graph RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory (application) permission before being used to add an Microsoft Entra ID object or user account to an Admin directory role (i.e. Global Administrators). This is a known attack path that is usually abused when a service principal already has the AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All permission granted. This permission allows an app to manage permission grants for application permissions to any A

sentinel medium kql

Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS Service Delete

'This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the deletion of an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service instance in a tenant. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server to spoof AD FS signing logs. The health AD FS service can then be deleted after it is no longer needed via HTTP requests to Azure. More information is available in this blog https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/'

sentinel medium kql

Microsoft Entra ID Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access

'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Microsoft Entra ID Health service agents (e.g AD FS). Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation). This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAge

sentinel medium kql

Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS New Server

'This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-premises AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/'

sentinel medium kql

Microsoft Entra ID Local Device Join Information and Transport Key Registry Keys Access

'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts by the same process to registry keys that provide information about an Microsoft Entra ID joined or registered devices and Transport keys (tkpub / tkpriv). This information can be used to export the Device Certificate (dkpub / dkpriv) and Transport key (tkpub/tkpriv). These set of keys can be used to impersonate existing Microsoft Entra ID joined devices. This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on

sentinel medium kql

NRT Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS New Server

'This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Microsoft Entra ID Hybrid Health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-premises AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/'