Sublime Security high experimental mql

VIP impersonation with urgent request (strict match, untrusted sender)

Sender is using a display name that matches the display name of someone in your $org_vips list. Detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks by analyzing text within email body from untrusted senders.

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Detection Logic

type.inbound
and any($org_vips, .display_name =~ sender.display_name)
and (
  any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents,
      .name == "bec" and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
  )
  or (
    any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
        .name == "urgency"
    )
    and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).entities,
            .name == "request"
    )
  )
)
and (
  (
    profile.by_sender().prevalence != "common"
    and not profile.by_sender().solicited
  )
  or (
    profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
    and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
  )
  or profile.by_sender().days_since.last_outbound > 365
)
// negate sharepoint notifications originating from within the org
and not (
  sender.email.email in ('no-reply@sharepointonline.com')
  and length(headers.reply_to) > 0
  and all(headers.reply_to, .email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
  (
    sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
    and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
  )
  or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign

Field Validations

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