Sublime Security high experimental mql
VIP impersonation: Invoice fraud with mobile device sign-off
Detects inbound messages where a prior thread contains a reply from a known VIP - identifiable by display name or email address and signed off with a 'Sent from my iPhone' or 'Sent from my iPad' footer. However that VIP has been silently dropped from the current message's recipients. This pattern is consistent with fraudulent invoice and payment request lures where an attacker impersonates an internal executive in a thread, then removes them before requesting payment action from the remaining recipients.
Detection Logic
type.inbound
and any(map(filter(body.previous_threads,
any($org_vips,
strings.icontains(..sender.display_name, .display_name)
or (
.email != ""
and strings.icontains(..sender.email.email, .email)
)
)
and (
strings.iends_with(.text,
"sent from my iphone.",
"sent from my ipad."
)
or regex.icontains(.text,
'(?:sent (?:via
| from) (?:my )?(?:iphone
| ipad)[^\n]{0,140}siri
| siri[^\n]{0,120}sent (?:via
| from) (?:my )?(?:iphone
| ipad))[^\n]{0,40}$'
)
// newer sign-offs ("Sent from this iPhone", "Sent from iPhone", optional period) are common in
// legitimate mail, so only count them on a one-to-one VIP message sent to internal recipients,
// with that VIP absent from the live message
or (
regex.icontains(.text,
'sent (?:via
| from) (?:my
| this
| an? )?(?:iphone
| ipad)\.?\s*$'
)
// the fabricated VIP message is one-to-one; long legitimate threads cc many people
and length(.recipients.to) + length(.recipients.cc) <= 2
and (
all(flatten([
recipients.to,
recipients.cc,
recipients.bcc
]
),
.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains
)
// or every recipient is at one domain that isn't the sender's (subsidiary domains)
or (
length(distinct(map(flatten([
recipients.to,
recipients.cc,
recipients.bcc
]
),
.email.domain.root_domain
)
)
) == 1
and not any(flatten([
recipients.to,
recipients.cc,
recipients.bcc
]
),
.email.domain.root_domain == sender.email.domain.root_domain
)
)
)
// the VIP who wrote this segment is not on the live message, checked by their listed address.
// skipped when the segment has no sender address: the fabricated VIP message usually has none, and
// the actor sometimes sends the fake thread to the VIP's own inbox
and (
.sender.email.email == ""
or not any(flatten([
recipients.to,
recipients.cc,
recipients.bcc
]
),
any($org_vips,
.email != ""
and strings.icontains(..email.email,
.email
)
and (
strings.icontains(...sender.display_name,
.display_name
)
or strings.icontains(...sender.email.email,
.email
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
and (
// any previous thread authored by the "VIP" has invoice/payment
any(ml.nlu_classifier(.text, subject=.subject.base).tags,
.name in ("invoice", "payment")
and .confidence != "low"
)
or any(ml.nlu_classifier(.text, subject=.subject.base).topics,
.name in (
"Request to View Invoice",
"Payment Information"
)
and .confidence != "low"
)
// if we don't get NLU but there is a W9 or Inv attached, we can assume it's invoice related
or any(attachments,
strings.istarts_with(.file_name, 'INV', "W-9", 'W9')
)
)
),
.sender.email.email
),
. == ""
or (
not strings.icontains(sender.email.email, .)
and not any(flatten([recipients.to, recipients.cc, recipients.bcc]),
strings.icontains(.email.email, ..)
)
)
) Field Validations
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