Sublime Security medium experimental mql

Spoofing: Hidden Outlook headers in self-addressed forwards

Catches messages where the sender address is spoofed to match the recipient (failing DMARC), simulating a self-forwarded email. The HTML body contains a hidden (display:none) block mimicking Outlook-style forward/reply headers (From/Sent/Subject), used to disguise injected lure content such as fake remittance receipts or finance document notifications. An NLU classifier confirms the thread content carries malicious intent rather than benign forwarding.

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Detection Logic

type.inbound
// self sender
and (
  sender.email.email == recipients.to[0].email.email
  and not coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
// a hidden quoted reply header... we can use translate() lowercases
// and strip spaces so `DISPLAY:NONE` or `display: none` would both match
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/XML/XPath/Reference/Functions/translate
and any(html.xpath(body.html,
                   '//*[contains(translate(@style, "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ ", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"), "display:none")]'
        ).nodes,
        // outlook-style headers... long to/cc lists can sit between sent and subject
        regex.icontains(.raw, 'From:.{0,1000}Sent:.{0,1000}Subject:')
)
and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents, .name != 'benign')

Field Validations

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