Sublime Security medium experimental mql
Spoofing: Hidden Outlook headers in self-addressed forwards
Catches messages where the sender address is spoofed to match the recipient (failing DMARC), simulating a self-forwarded email. The HTML body contains a hidden (display:none) block mimicking Outlook-style forward/reply headers (From/Sent/Subject), used to disguise injected lure content such as fake remittance receipts or finance document notifications. An NLU classifier confirms the thread content carries malicious intent rather than benign forwarding.
Detection Logic
type.inbound
// self sender
and (
sender.email.email == recipients.to[0].email.email
and not coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
// a hidden quoted reply header... we can use translate() lowercases
// and strip spaces so `DISPLAY:NONE` or `display: none` would both match
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/XML/XPath/Reference/Functions/translate
and any(html.xpath(body.html,
'//*[contains(translate(@style, "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ ", "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"), "display:none")]'
).nodes,
// outlook-style headers... long to/cc lists can sit between sent and subject
regex.icontains(.raw, 'From:.{0,1000}Sent:.{0,1000}Subject:')
)
and any(ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).intents, .name != 'benign') Field Validations
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