Sublime Security medium experimental mql
Cloud storage impersonation with credential theft indicators
Detects messages impersonating cloud storage services that contain hyperlinked images leading to free file hosts, where message screenshots reveal high-confidence credential theft language and storage-related urgency tactics.
Detection Logic
type.inbound
and (
0 < length(body.current_thread.links) < 10
or length(body.current_thread.links) > 100
)
and any([subject.subject, sender.display_name],
regex.icontains(.,
"(?:cloud
| storage
| mailbox
| account
| system
| service
| ^data)"
)
)
and any(ml.nlu_classifier(beta.ocr(file.message_screenshot()).text).intents,
.name == "cred_theft" and .confidence == "high"
)
and not any(ml.nlu_classifier(beta.ocr(file.message_screenshot()).text).topics,
.name == "Customer Service and Support" and .confidence == "high"
)
and regex.icontains(beta.ocr(file.message_screenshot()).text,
"storage.{0,50}full",
"free.{0,50}upgrade",
"storage.{0,50}details",
"storage.{0,50}quot",
"(?:mailbox
| account
| cloud).{0,50}(?:at risk
| storage
| disabled)",
'\d{2}%\s*capacity',
"data.{0,20}(?:removal
| purge
| protection mode)",
"billing.{0,20}suspended"
)
and not strings.ilike(beta.ocr(file.message_screenshot()).text, "*free plan*")
and (
any(body.current_thread.links,
// fingerprints of a hyperlinked image
.display_text is null
and .display_url.url is null
and .href_url.domain.domain not in $tenant_domains
and (
.href_url.domain.root_domain in $free_file_hosts
or .href_url.domain.root_domain in $url_shorteners
or network.whois(.href_url.domain).days_old < 365
or .href_url.domain.root_domain == "beehiiv.com"
or regex.icontains(.href_url.path, '^\/[a-z0-9]{20,}$')
or (
strings.icontains(.href_url.path, '.html')
and coalesce(.href_url.domain.root_domain, "null") != coalesce(sender.email.domain.root_domain,
""
)
)
or "google_adservices" in .href_url.rewrite.encoders
)
)
)
// and the sender is not from high trust sender root domains
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
) Field Validations
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