Sublime Security medium experimental mql
Business Email Compromise: Request for mobile number via reply thread hijacking
This rule detects BEC attacks that use reply threads to solicit mobile numbers, evading detection rules that exclude RE: subjects.
Detection Logic
type.inbound
and 0 < length(body.previous_threads) < 3
and length(filter(attachments, .file_type not in $file_types_images)) == 0
// Check previous_threads for mobile solicitation patterns
and any(body.previous_threads,
(
length(.text) < 500
// ignore disclaimers in body length calculation
or (
any(map(filter(ml.nlu_classifier(.text).entities,
.name == "disclaimer"
),
.text
),
(length(..text) - length(.)) < 500
)
)
)
and regex.icontains(.text,
'(?:mobile
| suitable
| contact
| current
| cell
| call
| another).{0,10}(?:phone
| number
| #
| \bno)
| personal\s?(?:phone
| cell
| number
| #)
| whatsapp
| \bcell
| personalcell
| (?:reliable
| recent).{0,30}(?:phone
| number
| #).{0,15}(?:contact
| reach)
| (?:share
| send
| confirm).{0,20}number.{0,25}(?:text
| sms
| whatsapp
| contact
| reach\syou[\s,.\?](?:by
| whether
| when
| for))
| best\s+(?:number
| #).{0,10}(?:text
| sms
| contact
| call
| message
| in[-\s]?touch
| to\suse)
| (?:best
| fastest)\s+way.{0,25}(?:reach
| contact
| get\s+in\s+touch).{0,25}(?:text
| sms
| whatsapp
| call
| message)
| reach\syou\sregarding\s(?:an?\s)?(?:office
| work)[\s-]*(?:matter
| task
| related
| assignment)
| touch base.{0,30}(?:concerning
| regarding
| about)\s(?:an?\s)?(?:work
| office)[\s-]*(?:matter
| task
| related
| assignment)
| at which.{0,15}(?:access
| reach)\syou
| (?:provide
| share
| send
| give
| confirm).{0,25}(?:phone\s*)?(?:number
| #
| line).{0,30}(?:contact
| reach
| call
| access
| get\sin\stouch\swith)\syou.{0,25}(?:regarding
| concerning
| about
| for).{0,20}(?:an?\s)?(?:work
| office
| business)[\s-]*(?:matter
| task
| related
| assignment
| issue
| project)'
)
)
// NLU analysis on previous_threads content
and (
any(body.previous_threads,
any(ml.nlu_classifier(.text).intents,
.name in ("bec", "advance_fee") and .confidence in ("medium", "high")
)
)
or (
// confidence can be low on very short bodies
any(body.previous_threads, length(.text) < 550)
and (
any(body.previous_threads,
any(ml.nlu_classifier(.text).intents, .name == "bec")
)
or any(ml.nlu_classifier(sender.display_name).intents, .name == "bec")
or any(body.previous_threads,
any(ml.nlu_classifier(.text).entities,
strings.icontains(.text, "kindly")
)
)
)
)
)
// Sender analysis
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
)
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
// not high trust sender domains
and not (
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
// Ensure this is likely a hijacked thread (sender doesn't match thread participants)
and (length(headers.references) > 0 or headers.in_reply_to is not null) Field Validations
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