Sublime Security medium experimental mql
Business Email Compromise (BEC) attempt from untrusted sender (French/Français)
Detects potential Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks by searching for common French BEC language within the email body from first-time senders.
Detection Logic
type.inbound
and length(body.links) == 0
and ml.nlu_classifier(body.current_thread.text).language == "french"
and 1 of (
regex.icontains(subject.subject,
'(mise (a
| à) jour
| changé
| changement).{0,20}(bancaire
| de banque)'
),
regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
'(changement
| changé) de (banque)
| changement bancaire
| coordonnées.{0,20}(compte
| banque
| bancaire
| salaire)',
),
(regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'parler.{0,20}confiance'))
)
// negating legit replies
and not (
(
strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "RE:")
// out of office auto-reply
// the NLU model will handle these better natively soon
or strings.istarts_with(subject.subject, "Automatic reply:")
or regex.imatch(subject.subject,
'(\[[^\]]+\]\s?){0,3}(re
| fwd?
| automat.*)\s?:.*'
)
)
and (length(headers.references) > 0 or headers.in_reply_to is not null)
)
and (
not profile.by_sender().solicited
or (
profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam
and not profile.by_sender().any_messages_benign
)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and (
(
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
) Field Validations
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