Sublime Security medium experimental mql

Brand impersonation: Box file sharing service

Detects messages impersonating Box file sharing service by identifying Box logos, collaboration-related language, or Box company address information from senders not associated with the legitimate box.com domain.

View Source

Detection Logic

type.inbound
and (
  (
    any(ml.logo_detect(file.message_screenshot()).brands, .name == "Box")
    and any([body.current_thread.text, subject.subject],
            regex.icontains(.,
                            'invited you to.{0,10}(?:view
| edit
| work together
| collaborate)',
                            'items were (?:deleted
| added)'
            )
    )
  )
  // Box address from footer
  or 2 of (
    strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'About Box'),
    strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, '900 Jefferson Ave'),
    strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, 'Redwood City, CA 94063')
  )
  or strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text,
                       "who is using SignRequest.com, an electronic signature tool"
  )
  or strings.icontains(body.current_thread.text, "sent by SignRequest BV")
)
and not (
  sender.email.domain.root_domain in (
    "box.com",
    "liftoff.io",
    "signrequest.com"
  )
  and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication
and not (
  sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains
  and coalesce(headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass, false)
)
// not a forward or reply
and (headers.in_reply_to is null or length(headers.references) == 0)
// negation for messages traversing box.com
// happens with custom sender domains
and not (
  any(headers.domains, .root_domain == "box.com")
  and headers.auth_summary.spf.pass
  and headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass
)

Field Validations

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