Sublime Security medium experimental mql
Attachment: Google share.google URL shortener in undocumented redirect forms
Detects inbound messages whose attachments contain links in either of two undocumented Google share.google redirect forms: google.<tld>/share.google?q=<code>, and share.google/?link=<url>. Both inherit Google domain reputation to mask an attacker-controlled destination. Google publishes the share.google shortener as a share.google/<code> path, but neither the on-Google-domain ‘q’ form nor the ‘link’ parameter form is documented. ICS calendar attachments are covered by a separate rule.
Detection Logic
type.inbound
and any(attachments,
not (
.file_type == "ics"
or .file_extension == "ics"
or .content_type in ("application/ics", "text/calendar")
)
and any(file.explode(.),
any(.scan.url.urls,
(
.domain.sld == "google"
and strings.istarts_with(.path, '/share.google')
and 'q' in keys(.query_params_decoded)
)
or (
.domain.root_domain == "share.google"
and any(["link", "_task", "_mbox", "_mimeclass"],
. in keys(..query_params_decoded)
)
)
)
)
) Field Validations
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