RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Detected as EICAR Test File
Detects Windows Defender (EventID 1119 - Remediation Action Failed) flagging TieringEngineService.exe dropped in a characteristic RS-{GUID} temporary directory, or the RedSun.exe process itself being present. This covers the staging pattern used by RedSun, a Cloud Files API and opportunistic lock (oplock) based AV bypass/privilege escalation tool. RedSun works as follows: 1. Registers a Cloud Files sync root and creates a Cloud Files placeholder for TieringEngineService.exe under %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\ 2. The placeholder file carries EICAR test file content (Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File) to reliably trigger a Defender scan and remediation attempt 3. Requests a batch oplock (FSCTL_REQUEST_BATCH_OPLOCK) on the placeholder file 4. When Defender attempts to scan/quarantine the file, the oplock triggers - holding the file open 5. During the oplock break window, RedSun swaps the mount point (junction) to redirect \\?\C:\Windows\System32 to the attacker-controlled temp path 6. This races the AV/OS into executing the malicious TieringEngineService.exe with elevated privileges
Detection Logic
{
"selection_eid": {
"EventID": 1119,
"SourceName": "Real-Time Protection"
},
"selection_susp_path": {
"Path
| endswith": "\\TieringEngineService.exe",
"ThreatName
| endswith": "EICAR_Test_File"
},
"selection_susp_process": {
"ProcessName
| endswith": "\\RedSun.exe"
},
"condition": "selection_eid and 1 of selection_susp_*"
} False Positives
- ⚠ Unlikely
Field Validations
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