Sigma critical experimental sigma

RedSun - TieringEngineService.exe Detected as EICAR Test File

Detects Windows Defender (EventID 1119 - Remediation Action Failed) flagging TieringEngineService.exe dropped in a characteristic RS-{GUID} temporary directory, or the RedSun.exe process itself being present. This covers the staging pattern used by RedSun, a Cloud Files API and opportunistic lock (oplock) based AV bypass/privilege escalation tool. RedSun works as follows: 1. Registers a Cloud Files sync root and creates a Cloud Files placeholder for TieringEngineService.exe under %TEMP%\RS-{GUID}\ 2. The placeholder file carries EICAR test file content (Virus:DOS/EICAR_Test_File) to reliably trigger a Defender scan and remediation attempt 3. Requests a batch oplock (FSCTL_REQUEST_BATCH_OPLOCK) on the placeholder file 4. When Defender attempts to scan/quarantine the file, the oplock triggers - holding the file open 5. During the oplock break window, RedSun swaps the mount point (junction) to redirect \\?\C:\Windows\System32 to the attacker-controlled temp path 6. This races the AV/OS into executing the malicious TieringEngineService.exe with elevated privileges

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Detection Logic

{
  "selection_eid": {
    "EventID": 1119,
    "SourceName": "Real-Time Protection"
  },
  "selection_susp_path": {
    "Path
| endswith": "\\TieringEngineService.exe",
    "ThreatName
| endswith": "EICAR_Test_File"
  },
  "selection_susp_process": {
    "ProcessName
| endswith": "\\RedSun.exe"
  },
  "condition": "selection_eid and 1 of selection_susp_*"
}

False Positives

  • ⚠ Unlikely

Field Validations

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