Panther high experimental python
Kubernetes Service Account Token Theft from Pod
This detection monitors for commands executed in pods that attempt to read service account tokens from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. Attackers who gain exec access to a pod can steal its service account token to authenticate as that service account to the Kubernetes API server. This enables privilege escalation and lateral movement within the cluster. This is a known attack technique documented by Stratus Red Team.
Detection Logic
from urllib.parse import unquote
from panther_kubernetes_helpers import (
is_failed_request,
is_system_namespace,
is_system_principal,
k8s_alert_context,
)
# Paths related to service account tokens that attackers target
SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_PATHS = {
# Standard Kubernetes service account token
"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token",
"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount",
# AWS EKS with IRSA (IAM Roles for Service Accounts)
"/var/run/secrets/eks.amazonaws.com/serviceaccount/token",
"/var/run/secrets/eks.amazonaws.com/serviceaccount",
# Azure AKS with Workload Identity
"/var/run/secrets/azure/tokens/azure-identity-token",
"/var/run/secrets/azure/tokens",
# GCP GKE with Workload Identity
"/var/run/secrets/tokens/gcp-ksa/token",
"/var/run/secrets/tokens/gcp-ksa",
# Partial path match for various token access patterns
"serviceaccount/token",
}
def rule(event):
verb = event.udm("verb")
resource = event.udm("resource")
subresource = event.udm("subresource")
namespace = event.udm("namespace")
username = event.udm("username")
response_status = event.udm("responseStatus")
# Only check exec subresource operations
if verb != "create" or resource != "pods" or subresource != "exec":
return False
# Skip failed requests
if is_failed_request(response_status):
return False
# Exclude system principals in system namespaces (legitimate operations)
# but alert on users stealing tokens from system namespaces (malicious)
if is_system_principal(username) and is_system_namespace(namespace):
return False
# Check command in requestObject
request_object = event.udm("requestObject") or {}
command = request_object.get("command", [])
command_str = " ".join(str(cmd) for cmd in command).lower()
# Check if command references service account token paths
if any(path.lower() in command_str for path in SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_PATHS):
return True
# Check requestURI (may contain URL-encoded paths)
request_uri = event.udm("requestURI") or ""
# URL decode to handle encoded characters like %2F for /
decoded_uri = unquote(request_uri).lower()
if any(path.lower() in decoded_uri for path in SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_PATHS):
return True
return False
def title(event):
username = event.udm("username") or "<UNKNOWN_USER>"
namespace = event.udm("namespace") or "<UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE>"
name = event.udm("name") or "<UNKNOWN_POD>"
return (
f"[{username}] attempted to steal service account token from pod " f"[{namespace}/{name}]"
)
def dedup(event):
username = event.udm("username") or "<UNKNOWN_USER>"
namespace = event.udm("namespace") or "<UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE>"
name = event.udm("name") or "<UNKNOWN_POD>"
return f"k8s_steal_token_{username}_{namespace}_{name}"
def alert_context(event):
request_object = event.udm("requestObject") or {}
command = request_object.get("command", [])
request_uri = event.udm("requestURI") or ""
return k8s_alert_context(
event,
extra_fields={
"pod_name": event.udm("name"),
"command": command,
"request_uri": request_uri,
"container": request_object.get("container"),
},
) Field Validations
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