Panther informational experimental python
AWS EC2 Image Monitoring
Checks CloudTrail for occurrences of EC2 Image Actions.
Detection Logic
# AWS CloudTrail API eventNames for EC2 Image Actions
EC2_IMAGE_ACTIONS = [
"CopyFpgaImage",
"CopyImage",
"CreateFpgaImage",
"CreateImage",
"CreateRestoreImageTask",
"CreateStoreImageTask",
"ImportImage",
]
def rule(event):
# Disqualify any eventSource that is not ec2
if event.get("eventSource", "") != "ec2.amazonaws.com":
return False
# Disqualify AWS Service-Service operations, which can appear in a variety of forms
if (
# FYI there is a weird quirk in the sourceIPAddress field of CloudTrail
# events with ec2.amazonaws.com as the source name where users of the
# web-console will have their sourceIPAddress recorded as "AWS Internal"
# though their userIdentity will be more normal.
# Example cloudtrail event in the "Terminate instance From WebUI with assumedRole" test
event.get("sourceIPAddress", "").endswith(".amazonaws.com")
or event.deep_get("userIdentity", "type", default="") == "AWSService"
or event.deep_get("userIdentity", "invokedBy", default="") == "AWS Internal"
or event.deep_get("userIdentity", "invokedBy", default="").endswith(".amazonaws.com")
):
return False
# Dry run operations get logged as SES Internal in the sourceIPAddress
# but not in the invokedBy field
if event.get("errorCode", "") == "Client.DryRunOperation":
return False
# Disqualify any eventNames that do not Include Image Actions
# and events that have readOnly set to false
if event.get("eventName", "") in EC2_IMAGE_ACTIONS:
return True
return False
def title(event):
return (
f"[{event.deep_get('userIdentity', 'sessionContext', 'sessionIssuer', 'userName')}] "
f"triggered a CloudTrail action [{event.get('eventName')}] "
f"within AWS Account ID: [{event.get('recipientAccountId')}]"
) Field Validations
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