Hayabusa high experimental sigma

DC Machine Account TGS Request from Non-DC Source IP

Detects a Kerberos service ticket request (Event 4769) targeting a Domain Controller machine account's service (e.g. DRSUAPI) originating from an IP address that is not a known Domain Controller. Service tickets for DC machine accounts should only be requested by other DCs during legitimate replication operations. An attacker with a valid TGT (obtained via PKINIT, overpass-the-hash, or stolen TGT) targeting a DC machine account's service from a workstation IP indicates preparation for DCSync or impersonation of a DC. Unlike Silver Ticket attacks (which forge the TGS and bypass this event), this rule catches attacks that go through the KDC legitimately. This rule requires %dc_machine_accounts% and %dc_ip_addresses% to be populated with all known DC machine account names and DC IP addresses respectively.

View Source

Detection Logic

{
  "security": {
    "Channel": "Security"
  },
  "selection": {
    "EventID": 4769,
    "Status": "0x0",
    "ServiceName
| endswith": "$",
    "ServiceName
| expand": "%dc_machine_accounts%"
  },
  "filter_main_dc_source": {
    "IpAddress
| expand": "%dc_ip_addresses%"
  },
  "filter_main_loopback": [
    {
      "IpAddress": [
        "127.0.0.1",
        "::1",
        "::ffff:127.0.0.1",
        "-"
      ]
    },
    {
      "IpAddress
| startswith": "fe80:"
    }
  ],
  "condition": "security and (selection and not 1 of filter_main_*)"
}

False Positives

  • Unlikely

Field Validations

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