DC Machine Account TGS Request from Non-DC Source IP
Detects a Kerberos service ticket request (Event 4769) targeting a Domain Controller machine account's service (e.g. DRSUAPI) originating from an IP address that is not a known Domain Controller. Service tickets for DC machine accounts should only be requested by other DCs during legitimate replication operations. An attacker with a valid TGT (obtained via PKINIT, overpass-the-hash, or stolen TGT) targeting a DC machine account's service from a workstation IP indicates preparation for DCSync or impersonation of a DC. Unlike Silver Ticket attacks (which forge the TGS and bypass this event), this rule catches attacks that go through the KDC legitimately. This rule requires %dc_machine_accounts% and %dc_ip_addresses% to be populated with all known DC machine account names and DC IP addresses respectively.
Detection Logic
{
"security": {
"Channel": "Security"
},
"selection": {
"EventID": 4769,
"Status": "0x0",
"ServiceName
| endswith": "$",
"ServiceName
| expand": "%dc_machine_accounts%"
},
"filter_main_dc_source": {
"IpAddress
| expand": "%dc_ip_addresses%"
},
"filter_main_loopback": [
{
"IpAddress": [
"127.0.0.1",
"::1",
"::ffff:127.0.0.1",
"-"
]
},
{
"IpAddress
| startswith": "fe80:"
}
],
"condition": "security and (selection and not 1 of filter_main_*)"
} False Positives
- ⚠ Unlikely
Field Validations
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