Process Injection From Untrusted Process

let timeframe = 2*1h;
let default_global_prevalence = 0;
let AllProcessInjectionEvents = materialize(
    DeviceEvents
| where ingestion_time() >= ago(timeframe)
| where ActionType in~ ("QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall","NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemoteApiCall", "CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall", "NtMapViewOfSectionRemoteApiCall") and ProcessId != InitiatingProcessId
| extend InitiatingProcessSHA1=tolower(InitiatingProcessSHA1)
| where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith FolderPath) // Exclude injection into processes in the same directory.
);
let SuspiciousProcessInjectionEvents = (
    AllProcessInjectionEvents
| where not(isempty(InitiatingProcessSHA1)) // Only with a valid SHA1.
| summarize MachineCount=dcount(DeviceId) by InitiatingProcessSHA1
    // Take 1000 of the most unique hashes, as files with high prevalence are very likely to be legitimately signed.
| top 1000 by MachineCount asc
| invoke FileProfile(InitiatingProcessSHA1, 1000)
| where not(ProfileAvailability =~ "Error")
| where coalesce(GlobalPrevalence,default_global_prevalence) < 200 or ((isempty(Signer) or not(IsCertificateValid)) and coalesce(GlobalPrevalence,default_global_prevalence) < 500)
);
AllProcessInjectionEvents
| lookup kind=inner SuspiciousProcessInjectionEvents on InitiatingProcessSHA1
// Work around the Defender limitation where FolderPath for CreateRemoteThreadApiCall does not contain FileName where it does for other events.
| extend InjectionTarget=strcat(FolderPath,@"\",FileName)
// Begin environment-specific filter.
// End environment-specific filter.
| summarize arg_min(Timestamp, *), InjectionTargets=make_set(InjectionTarget) by DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFolderPath // Show only the first invocation per device.
| extend InjectionSource=InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InjectionCommandLine=InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| project-reorder Timestamp, InjectionSource, InjectionCommandLine, InjectionTargets