Elastic medium stable kql
Suspicious Command Execution from Visual Studio Code
Detects Visual Studio Code ("Code.exe" on Windows or "Code Helper" on macOS) spawning a shell or downloader whose command line contains an encoded command, a download cradle, or a reverse-shell pattern. Malicious IDE extensions use the editor process to run these commands after install.
Detection Logic
FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-* METADATA _id, _version, _index
| WHERE KQL("""event.category:process and event.type:start""")
AND process.parent.name IN ("Code Helper (Plugin)", "Code Helper", "Code.exe", "code")
AND process.name IN (
"cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "sh", "bash", "zsh",
"dash", "nohup", "curl.exe", "curl", "wget",
"wget.exe", "pwsh.exe"
)
AND TO_LOWER(process.command_line) RLIKE """.*(-ec
| -enc
| -encodedcommand
| -nop
| -w hidden
| https
| /dev/tcp
| echo
| irm
| iwr
| base64
| nohup
| http:
| iex
| invoke-expression
| downloadstring
| downloadfile
| frombase64string
| chmod \+
| nc -e
| ncat
| certutil
| bitsadmin
| invoke-restmethod
| curl.*\
| .*sh
| wget.*\
| .*sh).*"""
AND NOT TO_LOWER(process.command_line) RLIKE """.*(docker.internal
| localhost
| 127.0.0.1
| aka.ms/vscode-powershell).*"""
| KEEP
_id,
_version,
_index,
data_stream.namespace,
@timestamp,
host.name,
host.id,
agent.id,
host.os.type,
user.name,
user.domain,
process.name,
process.parent.name,
process.parent.executable,
process.command_line,
process.executable,
process.parent.command_line,
process.parent.args Field Validations
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