Suspicious Child Process via Azure VM CustomScript Extension
Identifies a suspicious process executing as a descendant of the Azure VM CustomScript extension handler (CustomScriptHandler.exe) on a Windows host. The Azure CustomScript extension runs an attacker-supplied script with high privilege (SYSTEM) via the guest agent, and is a common cloud-to-host code-execution and persistence primitive. Because the extension's resource name is attacker-controlled and absent from on-host telemetry, this rule anchors on the type-bearing handler binary ('Microsoft.Compute.CustomScriptExtension\...\CustomScriptHandler.exe') rather than the spoofable extension name, making it resistant to renaming. CustomScript legitimately launches PowerShell and cmd, so the rule fires only when the descendant is an execution-proxy, download, or discovery LOLBin, or PowerShell exhibiting suspicious tradecraft.
Detection Logic
sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
/* Azure CustomScript extension handler */
[process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(process.name : "CustomScriptHandler.exe" or
process.executable : "?:\\Packages\\Plugins\\*CustomScript*\\*\\CustomScriptHandler.exe")] by process.entity_id
/* Abused LOLBin / suspicious PowerShell anywhere in its tree */
[process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(
process.name : ("mshta.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "installutil.exe", "msbuild.exe", "regasm.exe",
"regsvcs.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "nltest.exe", "whoami.exe",
"net.exe", "net1.exe", "wmic.exe", "systeminfo.exe", "quser.exe", "arp.exe", "tasklist.exe") or
(process.name : "certutil.exe" and process.args : ("*urlcache*", "*-decode*", "*-encode*")) or
(process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and
process.command_line : ("*-enc*", "*EncodedCommand*", "*FromBase64String*", "*DownloadString*", "*DownloadFile*",
"*Invoke-Expression*", "*IEX *", "*IEX(*", "*
| IEX*", "*-w hidden*", "*WindowStyle Hidden*",
"*Net.WebClient*", "*Invoke-WebRequest*", "*Start-BitsTransfer*"))
)] by process.Ext.ancestry Field Validations
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