Elastic medium stable eql
Potential Reverse Shell via UDP
This detection rule identifies suspicious network traffic patterns associated with UDP reverse shell activity. This activity consists of a sample of an execve, socket and connect syscall executed by the same process, where the auditd.data.a0-1 indicate a UDP connection, ending with an egress connection event. An attacker may establish a Linux UDP reverse shell to bypass traditional firewall restrictions and gain remote access to a target system covertly.
Detection Logic
sample by host.id, process.pid, process.parent.pid
[process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "executed" and process.name : (
"bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
"ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
) and
not process.args in ("/var/www/MISP/app/Console/cake", "/var/www/MISP/app", "/usr/local/bin/wp")]
[process where host.os.type == "linux" and auditd.data.syscall == "socket" and process.name : (
"bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
"ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
) and auditd.data.a1 == "2"]
[network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "connected-to" and
process.name : (
"bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish", "perl", "python*", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "php*",
"ruby", "openssl", "awk", "telnet", "lua*", "socat"
) and network.direction == "egress" and destination.ip != null and
not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "169.254.0.0/16", "224.0.0.0/4", "::1")] Field Validations
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