Elastic unknown experimental kql
Frequency of Process Execution via Network Logon by Source Address
This hunt aggregates process execution and remote network logons by source address, account name and process hash. It then limits the results by unique host within a 7 day period. This may indicate lateral movement via remote services.
Detection Logic
from logs-endpoint.events.process-*
| where @timestamp > now() - 7 day and host.os.family == "windows" and
event.category == "process" and event.action == "start" and
/* network logon type and the execution is within 30 seconds of the logon time */
process.Ext.session_info.logon_type == "Network" and process.Ext.session_info.relative_logon_time <= 30
| stats total = count(*) by process.Ext.session_info.client_address, user.name
/* sort by top source.ip and account */
| sort total desc
from logs-endpoint.events.process-*
| where @timestamp > now() - 7 day and host.os.family == "windows" and
event.category == "process" and event.action == "start" and
/* network logon type and the execution is within 30 seconds of the logon time */
process.Ext.session_info.logon_type == "Network" and process.Ext.session_info.relative_logon_time <= 30
| stats total = count(*), hosts = count_distinct(host.id) by process.hash.sha256, process.Ext.session_info.client_address, user.name, process.parent.name
/* unique hash limited to one host and number of execution is 1 */
| where hosts == 1 and total == 1 False Positives
- ⚠ The second query highest occurrence of source addresses/accounts performing remote process execution
- ⚠ `process.Ext.session_info.*` is populated for Elastic Defend versions 8.6.0+ and above.
- ⚠ Execution via legitimate Microsoft processes for PowerShell and cmd need to be further investigated via aggregation by `process.command_line`.
- ⚠ Aggregation can be also done by `process.executable`, normalizing process path by removing random patterns using the ES|QL REPLACE function.
Field Validations
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