Elastic medium stable kql

First Time Seen AWS Secret Value Accessed in Secrets Manager

An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service such as an EC2 instance, Lambda function, or other service may attempt to leverage the compromised service to access secrets in AWS Secrets Manager. This rule looks for the first time a specific user identity has programmatically retrieved a secret value from Secrets Manager using the GetSecretValue action. This rule assumes that AWS services such as Lambda functions and EC2 instances are setup with IAM role's assigned that have the necessary permissions to access the secrets in Secrets Manager. An adversary with access to a compromised AWS service would rely on its' attached role to access the secrets in Secrets Manager.

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Detection Logic

data_stream.dataset: aws.cloudtrail 
    and event.provider: secretsmanager.amazonaws.com 
    and event.action: GetSecretValue 
    and event.outcome: success
    and not user_agent.original: *Fargate*
    and not user.id: AWSServiceRole*

False Positives

  • Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be using GetSecretString API for the specified SecretId. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.

Field Validations

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