Elastic Defend high stable eql

Security Account Manager (SAM) Registry Access

Identifies attempts to read the Security Account Manager database through the registry, which adversaries can use to recover password hashes for local accounts.

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Detection Logic

sequence by process.entity_id
  [process where event.action == "start" and
   not process.executable : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe") and
   not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.command_line : "*Tanium*collectAdInfo.vbs*" and
        process.Ext.token.integrity_level_name == "system") and
   not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\Autopilot\\DiagonsticAnalysis.pif" and
        process.args : "?:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\Microsoft-Desktop-Provisioning-Diagnostic.dat") and
   not (process.parent.executable : "?:\\Program Files\\Rapid7\\Insight Agent\\components\\insight_agent\\*\\ir_agent.exe" and process.name : "reg.exe") and
   not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\backgroundTaskHost.exe" and
        process.parent.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" and process.parent.args : "DcomLaunch" and
        process.args : "-ServerName:BackgroundTaskHost.WebAccountProvider") and
   not process.hash.sha256 : "52f145a4ccc0f540a130bedbf04370a842daff1ee8d8361c75a8e0d21a88cf5a" and
   not (process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\msiexec.exe", "?:\\windows\\system32\\msiexec.exe") and
        process.parent.executable : "?:\\windows\\sys*\\msiexec.exe" and process.args : "-Embedding" and process.parent.args : "/V") and
   not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and 
        process.code_signature.subject_name : ("Trend Micro, Inc.", "Komodo Laboratories LLC", "Speckled Jay LLC", "Tenable Inc.", "HCL America Inc.", 
                                               "Kaspersky Lab*", "Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.", "AO Kaspersky Lab", "HCL America Inc.",
                                               "Kaspersky Lab JSC", "SentinelOne Inc.", "Nicholas Anderson", "Urs Beckmann")) and
   not process.hash.sha256 : 
                ("8016595ed2344c5322ea8eac1ffd490994417b5c4c745668aa5731ba9129e9fd", 
                 "f7e5566741042ce7a10cf2847279a0dd845ea813fdcb090cd4ee2359584c1496", 
                 "c9283a6b825629e698915b5d948f669c325ea1eb5310a6ff03c640a77e5d6b46",
                 "c9a91e8404a48a24254be9e127e23a40804f9c01674044bf37148e1b68a16814",
                 "c80b04c122161c6b762d8c1dd3aa20391d870d43f53150aecd7a9265b3955e45") and

   not (process.name == "powershell.exe" and process.parent.name == "cmd.exe" and
        process.parent.args == "'HKLM:\\SECURITY\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\'" and
        process.parent.args == "System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier($_.SID)).Translate([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value") and
   not (process.name == "cscript.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Program Files\\ansible\\GTS\\jre\\bin\\java.exe")
   ]
  [registry where event.action == "query" and
   registry.path : "HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\*" and

    /*
     encrypted password LM/NT bytes are stored in V regval
     under Account\Users key, to reduce noise we exclude following exact reg paths
    */

    not registry.path : ("HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users",
                         "HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Users\\Names",
                         "HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account",
                         "HKLM\\SAM\\SAM\\Domains\\Account\\Aliases\\*") and

     /* LogonUI.exe legitimately reads SAM for user account display on the logon screen */
     not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\LogonUI.exe" and
          registry.value : ("UserDontShowInLogonUI", "JC_PREV_V"))
    ]
    until [process where event.action == "end"]

Field Validations

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