Remote Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) over RPC

As described in ATT&CK, an adversary can use [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) (WMI) to view or manipulate objects on a remote host. It can be used to remotely edit configuration, start services, query files, and anything that can be done with a WMI class. When remote WMI requests are over RPC ([CAR-2014-05-001](../CAR-2014-05-001)), it connects to a DCOM interface within the RPC group netsvcs. To detect this activity, a sensor is needed at the network level that can decode RPC traffic or on the host where the communication can be detected more natively, such as [Event Tracing for Windows](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb968803.aspx). Using wireshark/tshark decoders, the WMI interfaces can be extracted so that WMI activity over RPC can be detected. Although the description details how to detect remote WMI precisely, a decent estimate has been to look for the string RPCSS within the initial RPC connection on 135/tcp. It returns a superset of this activity, and will trigger on all DCOM-related services running within RPC, which is likely to also be activity that should be detected between hosts. More about RPCSS at : [rpcss_dcom_interfaces.html](http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/articles/win_net_srv/rpcss_dcom_interfaces.html) ### Output Description Identifies the connection in which WMI traffic is seen, as well as the process(es) responsible for owning the connection.