Browse Rules

HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution

Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration.

HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution

Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration.

HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution

Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration.

SMB Session Setups

Account usage within SMB can be used to identify compromised credentials, and the hosts accessed with them. This analytic monitors SMB activity that deals with user activity rather than file activity.

User Login Activity Monitoring

Monitoring logon and logoff events for hosts on the network is very important for situational awareness. This information can be used as an indicator of unusual activity as well as to corroborate activity seen elsewhere. Could be applied to a number of different types of monitoring depending on what information is desired. Some use cases include monitoring for all remote connections and building login timelines for users. Logon events are Windows Event Code 4624 for Windows Vista and above, 518

Kerberos Config File Accessed by Osascript

Identifies the Osascript process accessing the Kerberos configuration file. Adversaries may attempt to access this file in order to gain situational awareness regarding the Active Directory domain to include its structure and settings.

Kerberos Config File Accessed by Untrusted or Unsigned Process

Identifies an untrusted or unsigned process accessing the Kerberos configuration file. Adversaries may attempt to access this file in order to gain situational awareness regarding the Active Directory domain to include its structure and settings.

Remote Desktop Logon

A remote desktop logon, through [RDP](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001), may be typical of a system administrator or IT support, but only from select workstations. Monitoring remote desktop logons and comparing to known/approved originating systems can detect lateral movement of an adversary.

Identifying Port Scanning Activity

After compromising an initial machine, adversaries commonly attempt to laterally move across the network. The first step to attempt the lateral movement often involves conducting host identification, port and service scans on the internal network via the compromised machine using tools such as Nmap, Cobalt Strike, etc.

System and Network Configuration Check

Detects when the SystemConfiguration preferences plist file is accessed by an unusual or suspicious process. This may indicate an attempt to gain situational awareness on a target system by reading network configuration details.

Windows System Information Discovery

Detects the execution of commands used to discover information about the system, which attackers may use after compromising a system to gain situational awareness.

Deprecated - PowerShell Script with Discovery Capabilities

Identifies the use of Cmdlets and methods related to discovery activities. Attackers can use these to perform various situational awareness related activities, like enumerating users, shares, sessions, domain trusts, groups, etc.

Query Registry using Built-in Tools

This rule identifies the execution of commands that can be used to query the Windows Registry. Adversaries may query the registry to gain situational awareness about the host, like installed security software, programs and settings.

Component Object Model Hijacking

Adversaries may establish persistence or escalate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. This is typically done by replacing COM object registry entries under the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID keys. Accordingly, this analytic looks for any changes under these keys.

Successful Local Account Login

The successful use of [Pass The Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002/) for lateral movement between workstations would trigger event ID 4624, with an event level of Information, from the security log. This behavior would be a LogonType of 3 using NTLM authentication where it is not a domain logon and not the ANONYMOUS LOGON account.

PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions

Detects PowerShell scripts that references native Windows API functions commonly used for discovery of users, groups, shares, sessions, domain trusts, and service security. Attackers use these APIs for situational awareness and targeting prior to lateral movement or collection.

Windows Linked Policies In ADSI Discovery

The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to query Active Directory for domain organizational units. This detection leverages PowerShell operational logs to identify script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=organizationalunit`, and `findAll()`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gain situational awareness of the domain structure.

Scheduled Task - FileAccess

In order to gain persistence, privilege escalation, or remote execution, an adversary may use the Windows Task Scheduler to schedule a command to be run at a specified time, date, and even host. Task Scheduler stores tasks as files in two locations - C:\Windows\Tasks (legacy) or C:\Windows\System32\Tasks. Accordingly, this analytic looks for the creation of task files in these two locations.

AdsiSearcher Account Discovery

The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for domain users. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify script blocks containing `[adsisearcher]`, `objectcategory=user`, and `.findAll()`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this coul

Access Permission Modification

Adversaries sometimes modify object access rights at the operating system level. There are varying motivations behind this action - they may not want some files/objects to be changed on systems for persistence reasons and therefore provide admin only rights; also, they may want files to be accessible with lower levels of permissions. Note - this analytic references file permissions, which are not currently in the CAR data model.

GetNetTcpconnection with PowerShell

The following analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-NetTcpConnection` command, which lists current TCP connections on a system. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing network reconnaissance or situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to

GetWmiObject Ds Computer with PowerShell

The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet to discover remote systems, specifically targeting the `DS_Computer` parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain computers and gather situational aware

Get ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy with Powershell

The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve the password policy in a Windows domain. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate attempts by adversaries to gather information about domain policies for situational awareness and Active Directory discov

GetDomainComputer with PowerShell

The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that utilize `Get-DomainComputer` to discover remote systems. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as `Get-DomainComputer` is part of PowerView, a tool often used by adversaries for domain enumeration and situational awareness. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow a

Remote System Discovery with Adsisearcher

The following analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell scripts to query Active Directory for domain computers. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific script blocks containing `adsisearcher` and `objectcategory=computer` with methods like `findAll()` or `findOne()`. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to perform Active Directory discovery and gain situational aware