Browse Rules

Linux Kernel Module Injection Detected

Inject Linux Kernel Modules from containers using insmod or modprobe with init_module and finit_module syscalls, given the precondition of sys_module effective capabilities. Profile the environment and consider allowed_container_images_loading_kernel_module to reduce noise and account for legitimate cases.

Autorun Differences

The Sysinternals tool [Autoruns](../sensors/autoruns) checks the registry and file system for known identify persistence mechanisms. It will output any tools identified, including built-in or added-on Microsoft functionality and third party software. Many of these locations are known by adversaries and used to obtain [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). Running Autoruns periodically in an environment makes it possible to collect and monitor its output for differences, which ma

Service Binary Modifications

Adversaries may modify the binary file for an existing service to achieve [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) while potentially [evading defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005). If a newly created or modified runs as a service, it may indicate APT activity. However, services are frequently installed by legitimate software. A well-tuned baseline is essential to differentiating between benign and malicious service modifications. ### Output Description The Service Na

Remote Registry

An adversary can remotely [manipulate the registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112) of another machine if the RemoteRegistry service is enabled and valid credentials are obtained. While the registry is remotely accessed, it can be used to prepare a [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) technique, [discover](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007) the configuration of a host, achieve [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), or anything that aids an

Execution with AT

In order to gain [persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/), [privilege escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/), or [remote execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/), an adversary may use the Windows built-in command AT (at.exe) to [schedule a command](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002) to be run at a specified time, date, and even host. This method has been used by adversaries and administrators alike. Its use may lead to detection of compromise

Write below root

Trying to write to any file directly below / or /root can serve as an auditing rule to track general system changes. Such rules can be noisy and challenging to interpret, particularly if your system frequently undergoes updates. However, careful profiling of your environment can transform this rule into an effective rule for detecting unusual behavior associated with system changes, including compliance-related cases. Lastly, this rule stands out as potentially the noisiest one among rules relat

BPF Program Not Profiled

BPF is a kernel technology that can be misused for malicious purposes, like "Linux Kernel Module Injection". This rule should be considered an auditing rule to notify you of any unprofiled BPF tools running in your environment. However, it requires customization after profiling your environment. BPF-powered agents make bpf syscalls all the time, so this rule only sends logs for BPF_PROG_LOAD calls (bpf cmd=5) in the enter event. If you also want to log whether the syscall failed or succeeded, re

Drop and execute new binary in container

Detect if an executable not belonging to the base image of a container is being executed. The drop and execute pattern can be observed very often after an attacker gained an initial foothold. is_exe_upper_layer filter field only applies for container runtimes that use overlayfs as union mount filesystem. Adopters can utilize the provided template list known_drop_and_execute_containers containing allowed container images known to execute binaries not included in their base image. Alternatively, y