Browse Rules

AWS GetFederationToken Followed by Console Login via Federation Exchange

Detects the three-event chain produced by tools like aws_consoler that convert exfiltrated long-term IAM access keys into browser-accessible AWS console sessions: GetFederationToken obtains temporary credentials, GetSigninToken exchanges them for a federation sign-in token via the AWS federation endpoint, and ConsoleLogin confirms the resulting console session was opened — all from the same source IP within two minutes. This sequence is a high-confidence indicator of credential abuse using stole

AWS Management Console Root Login

Identifies a successful login to the AWS Management Console by the Root user.

AWS Sign-In Token Created

Captures requests to the AWS federation endpoint (signin.amazonaws.com) for GetSigninToken. This API exchanges existing temporary AWS credentials (e.g., from STS GetFederationToken or AssumeRole) for a short-lived sign-in token that is embedded in a one-click URL to the AWS Management Console. It is commonly used by custom federation tools and automation to pivot from programmatic access to a browser session. This is a building block rule meant to be used for correlation with other rules to dete

AWS Sign-In Console Login with Federated User

Identifies when a federated user logs into the AWS Management Console. Federated users are typically given temporary credentials to access AWS services. If a federated user logs into the AWS Management Console without using MFA, it may indicate a security risk, as MFA adds an additional layer of security to the authentication process. However, CloudTrail does not record whether a Federated User utilized MFA as part of authentication — that MFA decision often occurs at a third-party IdP (e.g., Ok

AWS Management Console Brute Force of Root User Identity

Identifies a high number of failed authentication attempts to the AWS management console for the Root user identity. An adversary may attempt to brute force the password for the Root user identity, as it has complete access to all services and resources for the AWS account.

AWS IAM User Console Login Without MFA

Identifies the first observed occurrence, within the configured New Terms history window, of a regular IAM user successfully signing in to the AWS Management Console without multi-factor authentication. A password alone is a weaker control than password-plus-MFA, and an adversary who has phished, guessed, or otherwise obtained a user's password can sign in directly if MFA is not enforced for that user. This rule is scoped to standard IAM users only; it excludes the AWS root user (covered by

AWS Sign-In Root Password Recovery Requested

Identifies a password recovery request for the AWS account root user. In AWS, the PasswordRecoveryRequested event from signin.amazonaws.com applies to the root user’s “Forgot your password?” flow. Other identity types, like IAM and federated users, do not generate this event. This alert indicates that someone initiated the root password reset workflow for this account. Verify whether this was an expected action and review identity provider notifications/email to confirm legitimacy.

AWS IAM User Console Login from Multiple Geolocations

Identifies an IAM user that successfully signs in to the AWS Management Console from two or more distinct countries within a short window. A single user authenticating from multiple geographic locations in a brief period is physically implausible and indicates that the account's credentials or console session are being used from more than one place at once. This is a hallmark of adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing and session theft, where the legitimate user signs in from their location whil

AWS GetSigninToken [splunk-awscloudtrail]

The GetSigninToken API is part of the AWS Security Token Service and is used to generate a URL that allows federated users to sign in to the AWS Management Console via the AWS federation endpoint. Essentially, it provides a way to create a URL that users can click on to gain temporary access to the AWS Management Console without having to provide a username and password directly. Threat actors may attempt to abuse GetSignintoken to gain unauthorized access to AWS resources. This use case detects

Cross-Cloud Unauthorized Credential Access Detection From AWS RDS Login

'This detection correlates AWS GuardDuty Credential Access alerts related to Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) activity with Azure portal sign-in activities. It identifies successful and failed logins, anomalous behavior, and malicious IP access. By joining these datasets on network entities and IP addresses, it detects unauthorized credential access attempts across AWS and Azure resources, enhancing cross-cloud security monitoring.'

AWS EC2 Instance Console Login via Assumed Role

Detects successful AWS Management Console or federation login activity performed using an EC2 instance’s assumed role credentials. EC2 instances typically use temporary credentials to make API calls, not to authenticate interactively via the console. A successful "ConsoleLogin" or "GetSigninToken" event using a session pattern that includes "i-" (the EC2 instance ID) is highly anomalous and may indicate that an adversary obtained the instance’s temporary credentials from the instance metadata se

AWS IAM Login Profile Created or Modified for an IAM User

Identifies creation or modification of a console login profile for an AWS IAM user via CreateLoginProfile or UpdateLoginProfile. A login profile enables password-based console sign-in for an IAM user. Adversaries who obtain programmatic credentials may create a login profile to add persistent interactive console access, or update an existing profile to reset another user's password and take over the account, even after the original access keys are rotated. Because console access for IAM users is