Browse Rules

Search and filter across all detection sources

142 rules

panther high python

AWS Potentially Stolen Service Role

A role was assumed by an AWS service, followed by a user within 24 hours. This could indicate a stolen or compromised AWS service role.

sagan informational other

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (AssumeRoleWithSAML)

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (AssumeRoleWithSAML)

sagan informational other

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity)

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity)

sagan informational other

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (DecodeAuthorizationMessage)

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (DecodeAuthorizationMessage)

sagan informational other

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (GetAccessKeyInfo)

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (GetAccessKeyInfo)

sagan informational other

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (GetFederationToken)

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (GetFederationToken)

sagan informational other

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (GetSessionToken)

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service event detected (GetSessionToken)

chronicle high yara-l

AWS Config Service Modified

Detects when AWS Config Service is updated, stopped or deleted.

sagan informational other

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service Discovery Command Event Detected (GetCallerIdentity)

[AWS-STS] Security Token Service Discovery Command Event Detected (GetCallerIdentity)

anvilogic low other

AWS Storage Enumeration [snowflake-awscloudtrail]

Identify commands associated with enumerating storage services like S3 in AWS -- Threat Actor Association: GUI-vil

anvilogic low spl

AWS Storage Enumeration [splunk-awscloudtrail]

Identify commands associated with enumerating storage services like S3 in AWS -- Threat Actor Association: GUI-vil

elastic low kql

AWS STS Role Assumption by Service

Identifies when a service has assumed a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS). Services can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. Adversaries can use this technique for credential access and privilege escalation. This is a New Terms rule that identifies when a service assumes a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS) to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. While often legitimate, adversaries may use this technique for unauthorized access, p

panther informational python

AWS CloudFormation Stack IAM Service Role

Associating IAM roles with CloudFormation stacks ensures least privilege when making changes to your account.

elastic low kql

AWS Discovery API Calls via CLI from a Single Resource

Detects when a single AWS resource is running multiple read-only, discovery API calls in a 10-second window. This behavior could indicate an actor attempting to discover the AWS infrastructure using compromised credentials or a compromised instance. Adversaries may use this information to identify potential targets for further exploitation or to gain a better understanding of the target's infrastructure.

elastic medium kql

Deprecated - AWS RDS Instance/Cluster Stoppage

Identifies that an Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) cluster or instance has been stopped.

elastic low kql

AWS STS Role Assumption by User

Identifies when a user or role has assumed a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS). Users can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. Adversaries can use this technique for credential access and privilege escalation. This is a New Terms rule that identifies when a user assumes a role in AWS Security Token Service (STS) to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources. While often legitimate, adversaries may use this technique for unauthorized access, pr

elastic unknown kql

Multiple Service Logging Deleted or Stopped

This hunting query identifies the deletion or stopping of multiple service logging actions within AWS. Service logging is a critical security control that provides visibility into the activities and changes within AWS services. Adversaries may attempt to disable or delete service logging to evade detection and cover their tracks. Monitoring for multiple service logging deletions or stops can help identify potential malicious activity and ensure that critical security controls remain intact.

elastic high kql

AWS IAM API Calls via Temporary Session Tokens

Detects sensitive AWS IAM API operations executed using temporary session credentials (access key IDs beginning with "ASIA"). Temporary credentials are commonly issued through sts:GetSessionToken, sts:AssumeRole, or AWS SSO logins and are meant for short-term use. It is unusual for legitimate users or automated processes to perform privileged IAM actions (e.g., creating users, updating policies, or enabling/disabling MFA) with session tokens. This behavior may indicate credential theft, session

elastic high kql

AWS AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity from Kubernetes SA and External ASN

Detects successful `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` where the caller identity is a Kubernetes service account and the source autonomous system organization is present but not `Amazon.com, Inc.` EKS workloads that obtain IAM credentials via IAM Roles for Service Accounts (IRSA) normally reach STS from AWS-managed or AWS-associated networks; the same identity from a clearly external ASN can indicate a stolen or misused projected service-account token being exchanged for IAM credentials off-cluster.

elastic low kql

AWS STS AssumeRole with New MFA Device

Identifies when a user has assumed a role using a new MFA device. Users can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources using the AssumeRole API of AWS Security Token Service (STS). While a new MFA device is not always indicative of malicious behavior it should be verified as adversaries can use this technique for persistence and privilege escalation.

elastic medium kql

AWS EC2 Role GetCallerIdentity from New Source AS Organization

Identifies the first time an EC2 instance role session calls AWS STS GetCallerIdentity from a given source autonomous system (AS) organization name within the lookback window. Adversaries who steal instance role credentials often verify them with GetCallerIdentity from infrastructure outside your normal egress paths. Baseline learning on the pairing of identity and source network reduces noise from stable NAT or AWS-classified egress compared to alerting on every call from a non-Amazon ASN.

elastic high kql

AWS Lateral Movement from Kubernetes SA via AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity

Detects when credentials issued through `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity` for a Kubernetes service account identity are later used for several distinct AWS control-plane actions on the same session access key. Workloads that use EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts routinely exchange a projected service-account token for short-lived IAM credentials; this rule highlights sessions where that exchange is followed by a spread of sensitive APIs—reconnaissance, secrets and parameter access, IAM changes, or co

elastic high kql

AWS S3 Static Site JavaScript File Uploaded

This rule detects when a JavaScript file is uploaded in an S3 static site directory (`static/js/`) by an IAM user or assumed role. This can indicate suspicious modification of web content hosted on S3, such as injecting malicious scripts into a static website frontend.

elastic high kql

AWS First Occurrence of STS GetFederationToken Request by User

Identifies the first occurrence of an AWS Security Token Service (STS) GetFederationToken request made by a user. The GetFederationToken API call allows users to request temporary security credentials to access AWS resources. The maximum expiration period for these tokens is 36 hours and they can be used to create a console signin token even for identities that don't already have one. Adversaries may use this API to obtain temporary credentials for persistence and to bypass IAM API call limitati

elastic high kql

AWS EC2 Stop, Start, and User Data Modification Correlation

Identifies a short sequence of EC2 management APIs against the same instance that is consistent with modifying instance user data and forcing it to run on the next boot: `ModifyInstanceAttribute` with user data, followed by stop and start. Adversaries may update `userData` and cycle instance state so malicious scripts execute as root on Linux or as the system context on Windows. This rule correlates successful `StopInstances`, `StartInstances`, and `ModifyInstanceAttribute` events that reference