Browse Rules

AWS CloudWatch Log Group Deletion

Detects the deletion of an Amazon CloudWatch Log Group using the "DeleteLogGroup" API. CloudWatch log groups store operational and security logs for AWS services and custom applications. Deleting a log group permanently removes all associated log streams and historical log data, which can eliminate forensic evidence and disrupt security monitoring pipelines. Adversaries may delete log groups to conceal malicious activity, disable log forwarding, or impede incident response.

AWS CloudWatch Alarm Deletion

Detects the deletion of one or more Amazon CloudWatch alarms using the "DeleteAlarms" API. CloudWatch alarms are critical for monitoring metrics and triggering alerts when thresholds are exceeded. An adversary may delete alarms to impair visibility, silence alerts, and evade detection following malicious activity. This behavior may occur during post-exploitation or cleanup phases to remove traces of compromise or disable automated responses.

AWS CloudWatch Log Stream Deletion

Detects the deletion of an Amazon CloudWatch log stream using the "DeleteLogStream" API. Deleting a log stream permanently removes its associated log events and may disrupt security visibility, break audit trails, or suppress forensic evidence. Adversaries may delete log streams to conceal malicious actions, impair monitoring pipelines, or remove artifacts generated during post-exploitation activity.

AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services

The following analytic detects attempts to impair or disable AWS security services by monitoring specific deletion operations across GuardDuty, AWS WAF (classic and v2), CloudWatch, Route 53, and CloudWatch Logs. These actions include deleting detectors, rule groups, IP sets, web ACLs, logging configurations, alarms, and log streams. Adversaries may perform such operations to evade detection or remove visibility from defenders. By explicitly pairing eventName values with their corresponding even

AWS Bedrock AgentCore Execution Role Used Outside Its Runtime

Identifies an Amazon Bedrock AgentCore execution role (an AssumedRole identity whose role name begins with "AgentCore-" or contains "BedrockAgentCore") making an AWS API call to a service it has not previously called. AgentCore runtimes normally interact only with Bedrock inference, AgentCore data-plane, and observability services (CloudWatch Logs, X-Ray, CloudWatch metrics), so an execution role suddenly calling STS, EC2, IAM, Secrets Manager, or other services is a strong indicator that the ro

ASL AWS Defense Evasion Impair Security Services

The following analytic detects the deletion of critical AWS Security Services configurations, such as CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty detectors, and Web Application Firewall rules. It leverages Amazon Security Lake logs to identify specific API calls like "DeleteLogStream" and "DeleteDetector." This activity is significant because adversaries often use these actions to disable security monitoring and evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to operate undetected, leading

AWS SES Account Email Sending Enabled

Detects when account-level email sending is explicitly enabled in Amazon SES, via the v1 UpdateAccountSendingEnabled API with Enabled: true or the v2 PutAccountSendingAttributes API with SendingEnabled: true. Account-level sending is commonly paused by an administrator, or by automation wired to CloudWatch reputation alarms when bounce or complaint rates rise. An attacker who compromises an AWS account may re-enable sending to restore a paused capability as part of phishing infrastructure setup,