Browse Rules

Search and filter across all detection sources

19 rules

elastic high eql

Entra ID Sign-in BloodHound Suite User-Agent Detected

Identifies potential enumeration activity using AzureHound, SharpHound, or BloodHound across Microsoft cloud services. These tools are often used by red teamers and adversaries to map users, groups, roles, applications, and access relationships within Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365.

elastic medium kql

Microsoft Graph Multi-Category Reconnaissance Burst

Detects Microsoft Graph activity from delegated user tokens (public client, client_auth_method 0) where a single user session and source IP rapidly touches multiple high-value Graph paths indicative of reconnaissance. The query classifies requests into categories such as role discovery, cross-tenant relationship queries, mailbox paths, contact harvesting, and organization or licensing metadata. When three or more distinct categories appear within a short burst window, it suggests a broad enumera

elastic medium kql

Microsoft Graph Application Directory Reconnaissance with Denied Requests

Identifies a Microsoft Graph application querying multiple directory collections and encountering access denials. Adversaries with compromised application credentials may enumerate users, groups, applications, service principals, directory roles, role assignments, and OAuth grants to identify privileged identities and opportunities for further access.

elastic high kql

Azure AD Graph Access with Suspicious User-Agent

Identifies Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net) requests originating from user-agent strings associated with offensive tooling, scripting libraries, or generic HTTP clients. First-party Microsoft components calling AAD Graph identify with specific user agents such as "Microsoft Azure Graph Client Library", "Microsoft ADO.NET Data Services", or "Microsoft.OData.Client". Anything outside that recognised set is either a developer prototyping against the legacy API or an enumeration tool walking the d

elastic medium kql

Entra ID OAuth User Impersonation to Microsoft Graph

Identifies potential session hijacking or token replay in Microsoft Entra ID. This rule detects cases where a user signs in and subsequently accesses Microsoft Graph from a different IP address using the same session ID. This may indicate a successful OAuth phishing attack, session hijacking, or token replay attack, where an adversary has stolen a session cookie or refresh/access token and is impersonating the user from an alternate host or location.

elastic medium kql

Azure AD Graph Access with Unusual User and ASN

Identifies Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net) requests originating from network sources outside the major public-cloud and Microsoft ASNs that legitimate first-party callers normally come from. Adversary tooling typically rides on commodity hosting (residential ISPs, VPS providers, anonymisers) which produces an ASN distribution very different from the Microsoft / AWS / GCP / Akamai / Cloudflare ranges that dominate legitimate AAD Graph traffic.

elastic low kql

Microsoft Graph Request User Impersonation by Unusual Client

This New Terms rule focuses on the first occurrence of a client application ID (azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.app_id) making a request to Microsoft Graph API for a specific tenant ID (azure.tenant_id) and user principal object ID (azure.graphactivitylogs.properties.user_principal_object_id). This rule may helps identify unauthorized access or actions performed by compromised accounts. Advesaries may succesfully compromise a user's credentials and use the Microsoft Graph API to access resour

elastic medium kql

Entra ID Managed Device Client Sign-In to Graph Enumeration

Identifies a successful non-interactive Microsoft Entra ID client sign-in for Microsoft Graph that carries managed, joined device context and reports an Edge client when the exact access token is subsequently used by a scripted client to query at least three distinct Microsoft Graph directory-enumeration paths. The rule correlates the Entra sign-in token identifier with Microsoft Graph activity rather than relying on the broader session identifier, which can be shared by legitimate application a

elastic medium kql

Microsoft Graph Email Access by Unusual User and Client

Identifies access to email resources via Microsoft Graph API using an first-party application on behalf of a user principal. This behavior may indicate an adversary using a phished OAuth refresh token or a Primary Refresh Token (PRT) to access email resources. The pattern includes requests to Microsoft Graph API endpoints related to email, such as /me/mailFolders/inbox/messages or /users/{user_id}/messages, using a public client application ID and a user principal object ID. This is a New Terms

elastic high eql

Entra ID OAuth Device Code Sign-in to Azure AD Graph Enumeration

Correlates a successful Entra ID device-code sign-in to the legacy Azure AD Graph audience (00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000) from an unmanaged device with directory enumeration against graph.windows.net by the same user within a short window. Device-code phishing is the dominant OAuth phishing variant against Microsoft tenants: the adversary initiates the flow, relays the user-facing code to the victim, and on redemption walks away with an access or refresh token bound to the targeted resou

elastic medium kql

Entra ID External Authentication Methods (EAM) Modified

Identifies when an external authentication method (EAM) is added or modified in Entra ID. EAM may allow adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) requirements, potentially leading to unauthorized access to user accounts and sensitive resources by using bring-your-own IdP (BYOIDP) methods.

elastic high kql

Azure AD Graph Potential Enumeration (ROADrecon)

Detects a burst of Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net) directory enumeration by a single identity, keyed on the internal API version that ROADrecon hardcodes (`1.61-internal`, with `1.6-internal` as a related tooling value) plus a per-user request burst. ROADrecon's gather command walks the directory via this internal API version using aiohttp. This rule also detects the "evade" argument that routes every read through a single "/$batch" OData endpoint under a benign "Microsoft ADO.NET Data Servic

elastic medium kql

Entra ID OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application

Detects potentially suspicious OAuth authorization activity in Microsoft Entra ID where first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group request access to Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD resources. Developer tools like Azure CLI, Visual Studio Code, and Azure PowerShell accessing these resources are flagged, as they are commonly abused in phishing campaigns like ConsentFix. Additionally, any FOCI family application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Dir

elastic high kql

Entra ID Microsoft Authentication Broker Sign-In to Unusual Resource

Detects successful Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins where the client application is the Microsoft Authentication Broker (MAB) and the requested resource identifier is outside a short list of commonly observed first-party targets. Attackers abuse the broker in phishing and token broker flows to obtain tokens for unexpected APIs or enterprise applications. The exclusion list covers legacy Azure Active Directory, Microsoft Graph, Device Registration Service, Microsoft Intune Enrollment, extend or tune e

elastic high kql

M365 Identity OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application

Detects potentially suspicious OAuth authorization activity in Microsoft 365 where first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group request access to Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD resources. Developer tools like Azure CLI, Visual Studio Code, and Azure PowerShell accessing these resources are flagged, as they are commonly abused in phishing campaigns like ConsentFix. Additionally, any FOCI family application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Director

elastic high kql

Entra ID Potential AiTM Sign-In via OfficeHome (Tycoon2FA)

Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins consistent with Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity: the Microsoft Authentication Broker requesting tokens for Microsoft Graph or Exchange Online, or the Office web client application authenticating to itself, combined with Node.js-style user agents (node, axios, undici). Tycoon 2FA bypasses MFA by relaying authentication and capturing session material, often targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail. Baseline legitimate aut

elastic high kql

M365 Potential AiTM UserLoggedIn via Office App (Tycoon2FA)

Detects Microsoft 365 audit "UserLoggedIn" events consistent with Tycoon 2FA phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity: the Microsoft Authentication Broker requesting access where the object identifier matches Microsoft Graph or Exchange Online, or the Office web client application authenticating to itself, combined with Node.js-style user agents (node, axios, undici). Tycoon 2FA bypasses MFA by relaying authentication and capturing session material, often targeting M

elastic medium kql

Entra ID OAuth Authorization Code Grant for Unusual User, App, and Resource

Identifies the first occurrence of an OAuth 2.0 authorization code grant flow for a specific combination of client application, target resource, and user principal in Microsoft Entra ID. Developer tools like Azure CLI, Visual Studio Code, and Azure PowerShell accessing Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD are flagged for infrequent or first time usage by a user. Additionally, any FOCI (Family of Client IDs) application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Directory for the first time is f

elastic high kql

M365 Identity OAuth Flow by First-Party Microsoft App from Multiple IPs

Identifies sign-ins on behalf of a principal user to the Microsoft Graph or legacy Azure AD API from multiple IPs using first-party Microsoft applications from the FOCI (Family of Client IDs) group. Developer tools like Azure CLI, VSCode, and Azure PowerShell accessing these resources from multiple IPs are flagged, along with any FOCI application accessing the deprecated Windows Azure Active Directory from multiple IPs. This behavior may indicate an adversary using a phished OAuth authorization