Browse Rules

Entra ID Sign-in BloodHound Suite User-Agent Detected

Identifies potential enumeration activity using AzureHound, SharpHound, or BloodHound across Microsoft cloud services. These tools are often used by red teamers and adversaries to map users, groups, roles, applications, and access relationships within Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD) and Microsoft 365.

Multiple Cloud Secrets Accessed by Source Address

This rule detects authenticated sessions accessing secret stores across multiple environments from the same source address within a short period of time, including cloud providers (AWS, GCP, Azure) and Kubernetes clusters. Adversaries with access to compromised credentials or session tokens may attempt to retrieve secrets from services such as AWS Secrets Manager, Google Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, or Kubernetes Secrets in rapid succession to expand their access or exfiltrate sensitive info

Azure Storage Blob Retrieval via AzCopy

Identifies successful GetBlob operations on Azure Storage Accounts using AzCopy user agent with SAS token authentication. AzCopy is a command-line utility for copying data to and from Azure Storage. While legitimate for data migration, adversaries may abuse AzCopy with compromised SAS tokens to exfiltrate data from Azure Storage Accounts. This rule detects the first occurrence of GetBlob operations from a specific storage account using this pattern.

Azure Run Command Correlated with Process Execution

Correlates successful Azure Virtual Machine Run Command operations with endpoint process execution on the same host within minutes. Adversaries abuse Run Command to run scripts remotely as SYSTEM or root while activity logs only record the control-plane action; Elastic Defend process telemetry reveals the on-guest payload.

Azure Diagnostic Settings Deleted

Identifies the deletion of diagnostic settings in Azure, which send platform logs and metrics to different destinations. An adversary may delete diagnostic settings in an attempt to evade defenses.

Azure Arc Cluster Credential Access by Identity from Unusual Source

Detects when a service principal or user performs an Azure Arc cluster credential listing operation from a source IP not previously associated with that identity. The `listClusterUserCredential` action retrieves credentials for the Arc Cluster Connect proxy, enabling kubectl access through the Azure ARM API. An adversary using stolen service principal credentials will typically call this operation from infrastructure not previously seen for that SP. By tracking the combination of caller identity

Azure AKS Suspicious Self-Subject Review by Service Account or Node Identity

Detects AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service) service account or node identities invoking self-subject access or rules review APIs. Non-human identities rarely enumerate their own permissions outside known controllers; this can indicate stolen tokens probing effective RBAC before privilege escalation.

Rare Azure Activity Logs Event Failures

A machine learning job detected an unusual failure in an Azure Activity Logs message. These can be byproducts of attempted or successful persistence, privilege escalation, defense evasion, discovery, lateral movement, or collection.

Potential Azure OpenAI Model Theft

Monitors for suspicious activities that may indicate theft or unauthorized duplication of machine learning (ML) models, such as unauthorized API calls, atypical access patterns, or large data transfers that are unusual during model interactions.

Unusual Azure Activity Logs Event for a User

A machine learning job detected Azure Activity Logs activity that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from user context that does not normally use the event action. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys as someone uses a valid account to persist, move laterally, or exfiltrate data.

Azure OpenAI Insecure Output Handling

Detects when Azure OpenAI requests result in zero response length, potentially indicating issues in output handling that might lead to security exploits such as data leaks or code execution. This can occur in cases where the API fails to handle outputs correctly under certain input conditions.

Azure AD Graph Access with Suspicious User-Agent

Identifies Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net) requests originating from user-agent strings associated with offensive tooling, scripting libraries, or generic HTTP clients. First-party Microsoft components calling AAD Graph identify with specific user agents such as "Microsoft Azure Graph Client Library", "Microsoft ADO.NET Data Services", or "Microsoft.OData.Client". Anything outside that recognised set is either a developer prototyping against the legacy API or an enumeration tool walking the d

Spike in Azure Activity Logs Failed Messages

A machine learning job detected a significant spike in the rate of a particular failure in the Azure Activity Logs messages. Spikes in failed messages may accompany attempts at privilege escalation, lateral movement, or discovery.

Azure Key Vault Unusual Secret Key Usage

Identifies secrets, keys, or certificates retrieval operations from Azure Key Vault by a user principal that has not been seen previously doing so in a certain amount of days. Azure Key Vault is a cloud service for securely storing and accessing secrets, keys, and certificates. Unauthorized or excessive retrievals may indicate potential abuse or unauthorized access attempts.

Azure AD Graph Access with Unusual User and ASN

Identifies Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net) requests originating from network sources outside the major public-cloud and Microsoft ASNs that legitimate first-party callers normally come from. Adversary tooling typically rides on commodity hosting (residential ISPs, VPS providers, anonymisers) which produces an ASN distribution very different from the Microsoft / AWS / GCP / Akamai / Cloudflare ranges that dominate legitimate AAD Graph traffic.

Azure Recovery Services Resource Deleted

Identifies the deletion of Azure Recovery Services resources. Azure Recovery Services vaults contain data for copies of VMs, workloads, servers, and other resources regarding Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Adversaries may delete these recovery services to impact backup capabilities during stable operations or to inhibit disaster recovery services during ransom-based attacks or operational disruptions.

Azure Blob Storage Container Access Level Modified

Identifies changes to container access levels in Azure. Anonymous public read access to containers and blobs in Azure is a way to share data broadly, but can present a security risk if access to sensitive data is not managed judiciously.

Azure AD Graph Potential Enumeration (ROADrecon)

Detects an Azure AD Graph (graph.windows.net) burst from a user-agent identifying as "aiohttp" (the default HTTP library used by ROADrecon's "gather" command) where a single calling identity issues many requests in a short window. ROADrecon walks every interesting directory object type via aiohttp, producing a large volume of requests from one user / source IP / UA triple. The combination of "aiohttp" UA with a burst threshold is a structural ROADrecon signature; legitimate first-party Microsoft

Azure Key Vault Excessive Secret or Key Retrieved

Identifies excessive secret or key retrieval operations from Azure Key Vault. This rule detects when a user principal retrieves secrets or keys from Azure Key Vault multiple times within a short time frame, which may indicate potential abuse or unauthorized access attempts. The rule focuses on high-frequency retrieval operations that deviate from normal user behavior, suggesting possible credential harvesting or misuse of sensitive information.

Azure Storage Account Deletion by Unusual User

Identifies when an Azure Storage Account is deleted. Adversaries may delete storage accounts to disrupt operations, destroy evidence, or cause denial of service. This activity could indicate an attacker attempting to cover their tracks after data exfiltration or as part of a destructive attack. Monitoring storage account deletions is critical for detecting potential impact on business operations and data availability.

Unusual City for an Azure Activity Logs Event

A machine learning job detected Azure Activity Logs activity that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from a geolocation (city) that is unusual for the event action. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys being used by a threat actor in a different geography than the authorized user(s).

Unusual Country for an Azure Activity Logs Event

A machine learning job detected Azure Activity Logs activity that, while not inherently suspicious or abnormal, is sourcing from a geolocation (country) that is unusual for the event action. This can be the result of compromised credentials or keys being used by a threat actor in a different geography than the authorized user(s).

Azure VNet Full Network Packet Capture Enabled

Identifies potential full network packet capture in Azure. Packet Capture is an Azure Network Watcher feature that can be used to inspect network traffic. This feature can potentially be abused to read sensitive data from unencrypted internal traffic.

Azure AKS Kubernetes Events Deleted

Detects an identity deleting Kubernetes events on AKS (Azure Kubernetes Service), excluding known AKS control-plane and platform identities. Adversaries delete events (individually or in bulk via deletecollection) to remove evidence of pod creation, exec, or scheduling activity and impair incident response after operating in the cluster. Coverage includes workload service accounts (system:serviceaccount:*), so a compromised in-cluster token wiping events is not excluded.

Entra ID OAuth Device Code Sign-in to Azure AD Graph Enumeration

Correlates a successful Entra ID device-code sign-in to the legacy Azure AD Graph audience (00000002-0000-0000-c000-000000000000) from an unmanaged device with directory enumeration against graph.windows.net by the same user within a short window. Device-code phishing is the dominant OAuth phishing variant against Microsoft tenants: the adversary initiates the flow, relays the user-facing code to the victim, and on redemption walks away with an access or refresh token bound to the targeted resou