Browse Rules

AWS Bedrock Knowledge Base or RAG Data Source Tampering

Detects control-plane mutations to AWS Bedrock knowledge bases and their backing RAG data sources via CloudTrail. An adversary with access to Bedrock Agent APIs can poison the corpus that RAG-enabled models treat as authoritative by ingesting attacker-controlled documents (IngestKnowledgeBaseDocuments, StartIngestionJob), deleting legitimate documents (DeleteKnowledgeBaseDocuments), or repointing/altering the data source itself (CreateDataSource, UpdateDataSource, DeleteDataSource, UpdateKnowled

AWS Bedrock API Key Phantom User Activity Outside Bedrock

Identifies an Amazon Bedrock API key phantom user (an IAM user whose name starts with "BedrockAPIKey-") acting as the caller of a non-Bedrock API request, such as IAM, STS, EC2, VPC, or KMS calls. These users are provisioned by AWS to back a Bedrock bearer token and carry the AmazonBedrockLimitedAccess managed policy, which also grants IAM, VPC, and KMS reconnaissance. A phantom user performing activity outside of Bedrock indicates its credentials are being used beyond their intended scope, whic

AWS Bedrock Model Invocation Logging Disabled or Modified

Detects when an AWS Bedrock model invocation logging configuration is deleted or overwritten via the DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration or PutModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration API calls. Model invocation logging is the source that feeds the logs-aws_bedrock.invocation-* dataset relied upon by all data-plane Bedrock detections. An adversary who has gained access to a Bedrock environment can blind defenders by deleting this configuration, or by using the Put API to redirect logs to an att

AWS IAM Credentials Added to a Bedrock API Key Phantom User

Identifies standard IAM credentials being added to an Amazon Bedrock API key phantom user, whose user name starts with "BedrockAPIKey-": either a long-term access key (CreateAccessKey) or a console password / login profile (CreateLoginProfile, UpdateLoginProfile). When a long-term Bedrock API key is generated through the AWS Console, AWS silently provisions a "BedrockAPIKey-<id>" IAM user with the AmazonBedrockLimitedAccess managed policy. That user is intended only to back a Bedrock bearer toke

AWS Bedrock Provisioned Model Throughput Tampering

Detects creation, modification, or deletion of AWS Bedrock Provisioned Model Throughput via the CreateProvisionedModelThroughput, UpdateProvisionedModelThroughput, and DeleteProvisionedModelThroughput APIs. Provisioned Throughput reserves dedicated, billed model capacity for Amazon Bedrock. An adversary who scales this capacity up can drive large, unauthorized cost (cloud resource/bill hijacking), while deleting reserved throughput can cause denial of service to production workloads that depend

AWS Bedrock Automated Reasoning Safety Policy Tampering

Detects deletion or modification of AWS Bedrock Automated Reasoning policies via the DeleteAutomatedReasoningPolicy, UpdateAutomatedReasoningPolicy, or UpdateAutomatedReasoningPolicyAnnotations CloudTrail actions. Automated Reasoning policies are a Bedrock safety and validation control that constrains model outputs against formal rules. An adversary who deletes a policy or alters the policy definition or its annotations weakens an enforced output-validation defense, potentially allowing unsafe o

AWS Bedrock AgentCore Execution Role Used Outside Its Runtime

Identifies an Amazon Bedrock AgentCore execution role (an AssumedRole identity whose role name begins with "AgentCore-" or contains "BedrockAgentCore") making an AWS API call to a service it has not previously called. AgentCore runtimes normally interact only with Bedrock inference, AgentCore data-plane, and observability services (CloudWatch Logs, X-Ray, CloudWatch metrics), so an execution role suddenly calling STS, EC2, IAM, Secrets Manager, or other services is a strong indicator that the ro

AWS Bedrock Agent or Action Group Manipulation

Detects modification of deployed Amazon Bedrock agents and their action groups, collaborators, or aliases via the Bedrock Agent control plane. Adversaries with access to an AWS account can tamper with an existing, trusted agent by altering its instructions (UpdateAgent), adding or changing action groups that wire the agent to Lambda functions or APIs (CreateAgentActionGroup, UpdateAgentActionGroup), attaching or modifying collaborators (AssociateAgentCollaborator, UpdateAgentCollaborator), or re

AWS Bedrock Resource-Based Policy Modified or Deleted

Detects modification or deletion of resource-based access policies on AWS Bedrock resources via the PutResourcePolicy and DeleteResourcePolicy API calls. Resource-based policies govern which principals (including external accounts) may access Bedrock resources such as agents, knowledge bases, and custom models. An adversary may attach a resource policy granting an external or unexpected principal access to a Bedrock resource to establish persistence or enable cross-account access, or may delete

AWS Bedrock AgentCore Resource Created with IAM Execution Role

Detects the creation of an AWS Bedrock AgentCore resource (code interpreter, agent runtime, browser, or harness) with an IAM execution role attached. When an attacker with iam:PassRole permission creates an AgentCore resource and attaches a privileged role, subsequent invocations inside that resource execute as the attached role — enabling privilege escalation to roles that trust bedrock-agentcore.amazonaws.com.

AWS Bedrock Agent Created by IAM User or Root

Identifies AWS Bedrock Agent creation performed directly by an IAM user or the root account. Bedrock Agents are autonomous AI systems that execute multi-step tasks, invoke Lambda action groups to call external APIs, and query knowledge bases. Adversaries with access to an AWS account can create rogue agents configured to exfiltrate data via action group Lambda functions, pivot to other services, or act as a persistent AI-driven command-and-control channel. This rule is scoped to IAMUser and Root

AWS Bedrock Detected Multiple Attempts to use Denied Models by a Single User

Identifies multiple successive failed attempts to use denied model resources within AWS Bedrock. This could indicated attempts to bypass limitations of other approved models, or to force an impact on the environment by incurring exhorbitant costs.

AWS Bedrock API Key Used for Destructive or Anti-Recovery Action

Identifies an Amazon Bedrock API key (bearer token) being used to perform a destructive or anti-recovery control-plane action, such as deleting a guardrail, deleting a custom or imported model, removing provisioned throughput, or disabling model invocation logging. Bedrock API keys are bearer credentials intended for model invocation (InvokeModel, Converse); using one to delete Bedrock resources or disable logging is inconsistent with that purpose and is characteristic of LLMjacking or sabotage

AWS Bedrock Unauthorized Resource-Based Policy Modification Attempt

Detects failed, access-denied attempts to modify or delete resource-based access policies on AWS Bedrock resources via the PutResourcePolicy and DeleteResourcePolicy API calls. Resource-based policies govern which principals (including external accounts) may access Bedrock resources such as agents, knowledge bases, and custom models. A principal that is repeatedly denied when attempting to attach or remove these policies may be a compromised or under-privileged identity probing for the ability t

AWS Bedrock Untrusted Model Imported or Marketplace Endpoint Registered

Detects when an AWS Bedrock custom model is imported or deployed, or when a marketplace model endpoint is created or registered, via the CreateModelImportJob, CreateCustomModelDeployment, CreateMarketplaceModelEndpoint, or RegisterMarketplaceModelEndpoint API calls. These actions introduce a model artifact from outside the organization's trusted training and approval pipeline. A backdoored, poisoned, or attacker-supplied model that downstream applications subsequently invoke represents a softwar

AWS Bedrock Guardrails Detected Multiple Violations by a Single User Over a Session

Identifies multiple violations of AWS Bedrock guardrails by the same user in the same account over a session. Multiple violations implies that a user may be intentionally attempting to cirvumvent security controls, access sensitive information, or possibly exploit a vulnerability in the system.

AWS Bedrock Guardrails Detected Multiple Policy Violations Within a Single Blocked Request

Identifies multiple violations of AWS Bedrock guardrails within a single request, resulting in a block action, increasing the likelihood of malicious intent. Multiple violations implies that a user may be intentionally attempting to cirvumvent security controls, access sensitive information, or possibly exploit a vulnerability in the system.

AWS Bedrock AgentCore Runtime Prompt Containing Credentials

Identifies prompts sent to an Amazon Bedrock AgentCore runtime that contain AWS access key identifiers (AKIA long-term or ASIA temporary/STS), Amazon Bedrock API keys (ABSK bearer tokens), or PEM-encoded private keys. The runtime application logs record the caller-supplied prompt; credentials embedded in a prompt are exposed to the model provider, persisted in observability logs, and may be returned in completions or used by downstream tools. This commonly indicates accidental secret leakage by

AWS Bedrock Unauthorized Foundation Model Access Attempt

Identifies failed, access-denied attempts to enable account-level access to an Amazon Bedrock foundation model, either by granting a foundation-model entitlement, submitting a use case for model access, or creating a foundation-model agreement (accepting the EULA). These account-level "model access" actions unlock a foundation model so that it can subsequently be invoked. A principal that is repeatedly denied when attempting these actions may be a compromised or under-privileged identity probing

AWS Bedrock AgentCore Runtime Prompt Targeting Credentials or Instance Metadata

Identifies prompts sent to an Amazon Bedrock AgentCore runtime that attempt to harvest credentials or coerce the agent into exfiltrating data. The runtime application logs capture the caller-supplied prompt; this rule flags prompts that reference the cloud instance metadata service (169.254.169.254, the ECS task metadata address, or the "latest/meta-data" / "security-credentials" paths), prompts that name AWS access or secret keys directly, and prompt-injection or jailbreak language ("ignore pre

AWS Bedrock Foundation Model Access Enabled or Entitlement Granted

Identifies when access to an Amazon Bedrock foundation model is enabled at the account level, either by granting a foundation-model entitlement, submitting a use case for model access, or creating a foundation-model agreement (accepting the EULA). These account-level "model access" actions unlock a foundation model so that it can subsequently be invoked. Adversaries or a compromised principal may enable model access to abuse expensive models (LLMjacking), to establish a durable ability to invoke

AWS Bedrock Detected Multiple Validation Exception Errors by a Single User

Identifies multiple validation exeception errors within AWS Bedrock. Validation errors occur when you run the InvokeModel or InvokeModelWithResponseStream APIs on a foundation model that uses an incorrect inference parameter or corresponding value. These errors also occur when you use an inference parameter for one model with a model that doesn't have the same API parameter. This could indicate attempts to bypass limitations of other approved models, or to force an impact on the environment by i

AWS Bedrock Guardrail Deleted or Weakened

Detects deletion, weakening, or version management of AWS Bedrock guardrails via the DeleteGuardrail, UpdateGuardrail, DeleteEnforcedGuardrailConfiguration, or PutEnforcedGuardrailConfiguration APIs. Bedrock guardrails enforce content, topic, word, and sensitive-information policies on model invocations. Deleting a guardrail, loosening its policies, removing or overwriting the organization-enforced guardrail configuration, or creating a new version to enforce a weakened configuration allows an a

AWS Bedrock Third-Party or External Knowledge Base Associated to Agent

Detects when an Amazon Bedrock agent is associated with, or updated to use, a knowledge base via the AssociateAgentKnowledgeBase, or UpdateAgentKnowledgeBase API actions. Bedrock agents consume knowledge base (RAG) content as trusted context for the model. By wiring an agent to an externally controlled or third-party knowledge base, or by swapping in an attacker-controlled knowledge base, an adversary can redraw the agent's trust boundary toward an untrusted source. This is a software-supply-

AWS Bedrock Invocations without Guardrails Detected by a Single User Over a Session

Identifies multiple AWS Bedrock executions in a one minute time window without guardrails by the same user in the same account over a session. Multiple consecutive executions implies that a user may be intentionally attempting to bypass security controls, by not routing the requests with the desired guardrail configuration in order to access sensitive information, or possibly exploit a vulnerability in the system.