Browse Rules

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6 rules

panther high python

Zendesk API Token Created

A user created a new API token to be used with Zendesk.

panther informational python

Okta API Key Created

A user created an API Key in Okta

panther high python

Okta AD Agent Token Abuse - Behavioral

Detects potential Okta AD Agent token theft and abuse using behavioral analysis. Instead of relying on hardcoded service account patterns, this detection identifies when AD agent-related activities (API token creation, agent registration, config changes) occur from previously unseen IP addresses or user agents. This behavioral approach adapts to your environment and catches anomalous access patterns that may indicate compromised credentials or unauthorized token generation. **What This Detectio

panther medium python

Okta AD Agent Authentication Anomaly - Z-Score Detection

Detects potential Okta AD Agent token theft and credential abuse using statistical z-score analysis. This detection uses a lookup table containing 90-day behavioral baselines for each user's AD Agent authentication patterns, then calculates z-scores to identify suspicious activity in the last 7 days. **PREREQUISITES:** 1. Baseline builder query must run first: `Query.Okta.ADAgentBaselineBuilder` 2. Lookup table must be configured: `okta_ad_pantherflow_baseline_90d` 3. Allow 24 hours for initia

elastic medium kql

Multiple Device Token Hashes for Single Okta Session

This rule detects when a specific Okta actor has multiple device token hashes and multiple source IPs for a single Okta session. This may indicate an authenticated session has been hijacked or replayed from a different device and network. Adversaries may steal session cookies or tokens to gain unauthorized access to Okta admin console, applications, tenants, or other resources.

elastic low kql

GKE Secret Access via Unusual User Agent

Detects GKE secrets get or list requests from a previously unseen combination of source IP, identity, and user agent, excluding the default Kubernetes client placeholder. Attackers who compromise a pod or steal a kubeconfig often use curl, custom scripts, or atypical clients from a new host to read service-account tokens, registry credentials, or application secrets. Anonymous identities are excluded; use dedicated anonymous-access rules for unauthenticated probing.